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SUPREME COURT RULES
In Far-Reaching Decision
Against State Board
N. C. Board of Accountancy Forced
to Rescind Action Against National
Association Certified Members By
Injunction and Court Ruling.
In behalf of the National Asso
ciation of Certified Public Account
ants and its certified members af
fected in the matter, two of the of
ficers of the Association who had
been certified by the Board of Ac
countancy of North Carolina ob
tained an injunction from the Su
perior Court of that State against
this Board, which order reads in
part as follows:

“The defendants and each of
them, and their agents, employees
and servants are restrained and en
joined from cancelling the certifi
cate or license of plaintiff, and from
making any order in the premises,
or publishing or circulating any
statement of or concerning the plain
tiff as licensee of the said State
Board of Accountancy of North
Carolina. The defendants and each
of them are further enjoined from
holding any hearing upon the no
tice issued by them to plaintiff bear
ing date of November 5th, 1921.”
This order, coupled with the de
cision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, caused the State
Board of Accountancy to rescind
the curious resolution, printed
elsewhere in the Bulletin, to an
nounce the invalidity of their own
Certificates and to return the $25.00
fees which had been paid therefor.

North Carolina Court Invalidates
C. P. A. Certificates of Own State.

ALL ABOARD
If You’re Going
The question which the National
Association of Certified Public Ac
countants wishes to put squarely up
to all Accountants at this time is—
Is it not entirely desirable to hold
the Certificate of the National As
sociation which has back of it only
the National Association’s stand for
the Americanization of the profes
sion of accountancy by definite
comprehensive National legislation
and National license, and the aggre
gate reputation of the high grade
professionals all over the country,
who are its certified members, as
well as to hold the local State cer
tificates, which are founded only
upon special local legislation and
which have back of them only the
action of the State Boards of Ac
countancy, which action, in certain
instances, is or is not legal, depend
ent upon whether or not the quasi
judicial authority conferred upon
these Boards has been delegated to
some unofficial body, or whether or
not they have acted beyond their
jurisdiction, as laid down in the
decision rendered by the Supreme
Court of the State of North Caro
lina, and which decision has already
invalidated and made worthless
many Certificates issued by that
State Board and has, at least, raised
a doubt as to the validity of many
Certificates issued by other State
Boards. The National Association
suggests that accountants read care
fully the decision of the highest
court in North Carolina and our
analysis of the profession of today,

The most interesting court deci
sion, to the profession of Account
ancy, ever handed down, has just re
cently been rendered by the Su
preme Court of North Carolina.
The case at bar involved the ques
tion of the legal right of the State
Board of Accountancy to act be
yond the boundaries of the State in
the matter of holding of examina
tions and rating of candidates for
their qualifications for certification,
as certified public accountants. In
this case, which the court decided
against the State Board and by
which decision all certificates
granted upon the ultra vires acts of
the Board were invalidated, the
court rather went out of its way to
render an opinion of very broad
scope and wide import to the pro
fession for which the profession
should be thankful for at last we
have something in law to steer by.
(Continued in Various Other Columns

all of which appears in full in this
issue of the Bulletin, and then fill
out and mail to us, with class of
membership desired checked, the
following blank form:

CUT THIS OUT AND SEND TO
US
Kindly send me blank application
form for (1) Ctfd. Membership;
(2)
Junior Membership in the
National Association of Certified
Public Accountants, Washington,
D. C.
Signed................................................
Address; Street................................
City .......................................... .........
State ..................................................
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ANALYSIS OF THE PROFES
SION OF ACCOUNTANCY
C. P. A. Total Accomplishment

In the last issue of the Bulletin, in
the general analysis of the present
value of C. P. A. in Accountancy, the
National Association attempted to
show the value of what has been ac
complished by years of effort by those
interested in the activity of the ac
countant and by their organizations in
having legislation passed to enable a
certain element in the profession to
become possessed of this C. P. A. des
ignation. This value, according to our
analysis, sums up into a more or less
meaningless designation, so far as real
VALUE is concerned.
This C. P. A. activity on the part
of the members of the profession, lead
ers, who have been supposed to lead
professional thought, and guard pro
fessional welfare, seems to have been,
and to be, the sum total of their legis
lative conception. We know of no at
tempt to conceive of, or present a
policy and plan for the organization
and advancement of the activity of the
accountant as a profession. We know
of no attempt to conceive of the value
of the profession as a whole, or to vis
ualize the meaning of the aggregate
result of its activity and what that
meaning would require, in the way
of comprehensive legislative enactment
and formal definition in law, in order
to bring about a proper public com
prehension, recognition and apprecia
tion out of which would come an in
calculable increase in professional em
ployment, to the public advantage.
PROFESSION IGNORED

In a profession supposed to include
capable analytical minds, trained to
policy forming and organization crea
tion and to the fundamental need of
comprehensive visualization by the as
semblage, comparison and valuation of
components and factors forming the
whole, it is extraordinary to realize
that there has been no attempt to vis
ualize the requirements of the profes
sion to which these minds belong; to

witness, in an activity, which in no
sense can be properly confined within
state boundaries, all activities of pro
fessionals centered upon the enact
ment of state laws; to witness, in an
activity which has the widest public
importance, every effort being cen
tered upon the securement of special
law, of the standardization of special
law, for a limited, and minority ele
ment even, of the profession itself, and,
still more extraordinary; to witness,
as a sum total of legislative enactment,
merely a system of grading of profes
sionals, with no legislative enactments,
or demands therefor, for the profes
sion itself; to witness, THE PROFES
SION OF ACCOUNTANCY ignored
in the statutes of the various States
and of the Nation.
PROFESSION FIRST

In the last issue of the Bulletin the
National Association of Certified Pub
lic Accountants made plain its stand
that, while it would do all possible for
the public acknowledgment and ap
preciation of the degree of Certified
Public Accountant, it stood first and
foremost for the PROFESSION OF
ACCOUNTANCY, AS A WHOLE,
in that its conception of the “Value of
the Profession” to the Public was,
that without it, an intelligent regula
tion of public and private affairs,
through a true knowledge of condi
tions, requirements, possessions and
values, could not be obtained. The
National Association in this issue of
the Bulletin, after having gained at
tention by presenting first that which
is really secondary in importance,
merely because it is generally thought
of first, namely, the value of “C. P. A.
in Accountancy,” will take up the
fundamental and, so far, absolutely dis
regarded feature, the public (economic)
value of the profession of accountancy,
its current condition and professional
position, under local C. P. A. legisla
tion, the desirability of a comprehen
sive national definition, regulation and
control, and the necessity of a compre
hensive knowledge by the profession
concerning the profession itself.

NATIONAL SCOPE

It is impossible to confine the results
of the activities of the accountant
within the confines of the state. An
accountant making a report to a client
in the Village of X, State of X, will
reflect in his work beyond the client,
beyond the village, beyond the state,
and to the extent that the stockhold
ers, debtors, creditors, bankers and
others interested in the business of the
client, may be distributed over the
length and the breadth of the United
States of America. The elements re
flected in the books, records and ac
counts of nearly every business activ
ity, no matter how small, are not con
fined in this present day of interstate
business, within the boundaries of sin
gle states. The smallest merchant will
buy his goods in numbers of states and
his affairs, reflected in his accounts,
will reflect and tie up with the affairs,
through the accounts, of all of those
with whom he does business. The ac
countant, in making his report, is re
porting in effect, through the proprie
tor, to the debtors, creditors, stock
holders and other interests connected
and interested in the business, wherever
they may be located, from the Atlantic
to the Pacific, from Canada to the Gulf
of Mexico, and beyond. The findings
of the accountant in the village of X
are taken up in the findings of the ac
countant in the city of Y, through the
affairs of the second accountant’s client
who has business connections with the
client of the accountant in the village
of X, and his report in turn to his
client reflects the work and the value
of the first accountant, to the extent
to which the two business organiza
tions have dealings together, and the
work of the original accountant is car
ried forward and reflected and re
reflected to all those who may be in
terested in the affairs of the business
in the city of Y, and again carried
forward, as reflecting in the accounts
of other and wider business affairs,
indefinitely, for good or for bad, ac
cording to the soundness and truth, or
its lack, contained in the first report.
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In our present-day, closely-welded, na
tional business organization, the ac
countant’s work, no matter where it
may be done, or for whom it may be
done, reflects in the whole. The ac
countant’s value is a public value and
cannot be a private value. The result
of his work cannot be confined, and
not only reflects in business but runs
through local ordinance, state law to
national law, and upon him rests intel
ligent and beneficent regulation of
business, taxation and other matters
subject to public enactment, if his work
be sound and his report be true, or
regulation which may do the greatest
harm if founded upon information in
accurate, partial or erroneous. It
would be far more reasonable to take
the stand that bankruptcy should be a
matter subject for state enactment and
regulation, than to take the stand that
the profession of accountancy may be
adequately controlled, regulated or benefitted in the public or professional
interest by state or other local legis
lation. In order that accountancy may
be actually a profession, a profession
in fact as well as in fancy, it will be
necessary to have it defined, regulated
and controlled by national law. In
order that accountancy may be a pro
fession, the accountant’s first regard
must be for the profession and not be
for a degree or honor of that profes
sion. The profession must first be
legally established and legally ac
knowledged as a basis upon which to
rate the standard for the degree of the
profession, to prescribe the method of
obtaining the degree and to set up
rules and standards of professional
ethics and practice. From the nature
and effect of the activity and of its
wide, general public importance, this
can only be done effectively by national
legislation.
YOUR OWN MEDICINE

If the accountants of the country
were asked by a client, who was the
proper officer in a controlling company
of a group of corporations, to furnish
statements showing the condition and
the results of operations of 48 sub

sidiary corporations of the group, all
of which were doing business, one
with the other, and all with the parent
corporation, and all of which being
controlled by the parent corporation,
the accountants of the country would
not undertake to present separate re
ports on the individual companies nor
would they undertake to investigate
the companies as individual companies,
but would rather regard them all as
a group to be consolidated in order to
obtain the true reflection of conditions
and values. They would set up their
consolidated schedules showing inter
company adjustments and eliminations
and would in every way undertake to
standardize and harmonize terms,
methods and values on the common
basis necessary to make the activities
of all susceptible to one general re
port. This would be done because ex
perience has taught that the holding
company is the accounting catchall for
the assembling of group values and
the only medium through which group
operation may be correctly reflected
and observed.
If, instead of companies, the account
ants of the country have a problem of
their own, which involves their own
profession, and in which problem there
are 48 units of activity under 48 laws
and 48 administrations controlled by a
49th activity and administration, all
doing business one with another, why
have they not the same problem, sus
ceptible to the same treatment em
ployed by them in business, to deter
mine the value and result of the activ
ity as a group, under its holding com
pany. There are 48 states, under 48
laws, with 48 administrations, con
trolled by the holding company, the
National Government, under the Na
tional Constitution. Why will not the
experience of business, finance and ac
counts apply and indicate that consoli
dation is the only way which will fur
nish a true picture of policy, plan,
organization and control? Why will
not the method successfully developed
by accountants and used by them in
outside business—be a logical and a
proper method for the accountants to

apply to their own business? Do the
accountants of the country prescribe
medicine for all but themselves? Do
they apply business methods to all but
their own affairs?
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT
The National Association feels that
the question of group activity of almost
any kind is susceptible of consolidated
treatment, that the reflections and re
sults will be true and good in all con
solidated cases, and that the consoli
dated way is the only logical and com
mon sense way, clearly recognizable to
all accountants, to approach and de
termine the value and condition of
the profession of accountancy in the
48 States of the Union under the Na
tional Government, in order to intelli
gently provide for, regulate and con
duct the affairs of the profession as
a whole.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE

Strange as it may seem there are
still those, and not a few, high in the
profession, who are advocating local
legislation instead of national legisla
tion—who are standing back of the
value of State laws instead of advocat
ing national laws—who are attempting
an informal, private regulation and co
ordination of what should be a formal
and public coordination and regulation;
and who are still contending that the
laws in force in the various States
which merely establish a grade within
the profession of accountancy, are all
important and entirely adequate. When
the profession at large witnesses the
American Institute of Accountants urg
ing the passage of a piece of local leg
islation for the District of Columbia,
modeled after the local laws of the
various States, and carrying in its pro
visions the same single purpose,
namely, the conference of a title or de
gree to a certain minority element of
the profession, and with nothing there
in contained to provide for protection
of the public or for the requirements
of the profession, as a whole, it pre
sents most clearly the fact that present
leadership within the profession, has

THE C. P. A. BULLETIN

4

failed to comprehend the tremendous
advance which the profession has made
in the public estimation, in the public
use, and as an economic factor in the
past five years. The passage of broad
national legislation takes no more time
or effort to have enacted than does the
purely local legislation for the District
of Columbia. Both houses of Congress
must pass upon and the President of
the United States must sign both. In
asmuch as the American Institute of
Accountants is still advocating this local
class of legislation, and has not evi
denced a comprehension of general re
quirements by the advocacy of broad
national legislation, apparently deeming
its unofficial private co-ordinating influ
ence to be sufficient and legal and that
the public and the profession as a
whole will accept such privately con
trolled service in lieu of the usual
American custom of the delegation of
authority by the people through their
legislative and official channels to those
whom it names to serve them, the Na
tional Association of Certified Public
Accountants takes issue in this matter
and presents the question upon the
American plan.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

The National Association believes
that the American custom should be
followed in the profession of Account
ancy along the lines that have been es
tablished for other important profes
sions within the United States. It does
not believe that any public interest is
served in the enactment of local leg
islation for an activity which is nation
wide, for an activity which is interstate,
for an activity the result of which af
fects the whole people. The National
Association believes that the so-called
Capper Bill, which is being urged by
the American Institute of Accountants,
serves no good purpose in the public
interest, in that it does not attempt to
regulate an activity but merely seeks
to confer a designation, that it does not
serve the public interest because it is
local legislation and not national legis
lation, that it confers authority with no
responsibility, that it legislates in behalf

of a small part and against a larger part
of a profession, that it does not define
the profession, that it creates a mon
opoly in control of a favored few which
results in a less valuable professional
service at a higher public cost, and that
this form of legislation through the
statutes of the various States, has
proved to be undesirable and ineffective
in the public interest, and has only
served to hold back the development
of the value of the profession and to
curtail its uses by the public. The Na
tional Association does not believe that
the American people or an American
profession will accept a controlling in
fluence other than that which is pre
scribed in the usual legal way, and that,
in the event of the enactment of this
Bill there would be merely another sep
arate enactment which would require
co-ordination with other similar legisla
tion throughout the country, with no
official controlling or co-ordinating in
fluence provided for.
The National Association of Certi
fied Public Accountants recommends
that all those members of the profes
sion of Accountancy who wish to see
the profession actually made a profes
sion with its practices adequately con
trolled in the public interest to the ulti
mate benefit of all of those engaged
in public accounting, make themselves
heard in the Halls of Congress in no
uncertain way in behalf of adequate
legislation in behalf of the people and
the profession as a whole and opposed
to the inadequate legislation represent
ed in this bill, Senate No. 2531; H. R.
No. 8522.
JUST FINDING ITSELF

No accountant will contend, who has
given the matter thought, and who has
been placed where he might have a
broad general observation, but that
Accountancy, in any but a very narrow
sense, has become a profession, such as
is worthy to be called the name, in a
comparatively short period of time. In
fact, the last four years, carrying with
them a complicated general Income
Tax Law, with the necessity of the de
termination, not only of the income of

the nation but of the capital of the
nation as well, has done more to make
the profession real than all else preced
ing.
C. P. A. Laws have not done this,
neither has it been the efforts, thought
or direction of master minds within the
profession, the fact is the profession,
like Topsy, “just grew”—and “grew
big.” It is undoubtedly true that the
profession has not yet found itself—
but the profession has been found by
the public. This is more or less ap
preciated in a hazy way. The profes
sional boards, associations, societies
and individual professionals know it,
business and the public know it, we all
know it—but what are we all doing?
Nothing!, or, at least, as near nothing,
as the continued effort to enact C. P.
A. legislation or standardize and in
formally co-ordinate C. P. A. legisla
tion is compared to the great big. things
which this big new national economic
medium requires to be done.

FORGET THE PAST
LOOK TO THE FUTURE

The National Association does not
undertake to argue with or criticise the
past, whether legislation was adequate
or inadequate, be that as it may;
whether or not leadership in the profes
sion should have taken steps different
from those which it did take, will not
help now to do what is perfectly obvi
ous should be done. It is lost time to
consider the past at the sacrifice of the
comprehension of the present and fu
ture; to enter into useless crimination
and recrimination to the division of the
force which must be united to accom
plish now a plain professional duty to
the profession. What the National As
sociation will criticise and what the
National Association will expose, will
be those who fail to comprehend the
profession of today, and the facts and
conditions of today within the profes
sion, and those who continue to attempt
to apply conceptions, methods, customs
and regulations more or less useful (or
useless), in the past to a nebulous and
generally unacknowledged profession,
the value of which never generally rec
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ognized, to a profession, which, out of
circumstance and economic evolution,
has come to the rank of highest value,
widest scope, and greatest public im
portance—a profession of wonderful
possibilities for a wider and more gen
eral usefulness, and which, owing to
the rapidity of its transition has yet to
be defined, organized and regulated on
the big new basis of its being.
NATIONAL DEMANDS

What the National Association de
mands is that there be a general com
prehension within the profession of
what the aggregate activity of the pro
fession as a whole means; of what is
the aggregate effect of the activity; of
its value; of its importance; of its farreachingness and of its unsusceptibility
of confinement within national political
sub-divisions: that there be a general
realization of the necessity for general
comprehensive legislation, not special
legislation; that there be national legis
lation, not state legislation; that C. P.
A. laws will not suffice and have not
sufficed; that the profession has ac
tually become a profession though not
legally recognized; that C. P. A., as at
present applied, represents not really
the degree or license of a profession,
but represents merely a decoration or
honor to professionals; that C. P. A.
should represent the professional de
gree; that as in law or any other recog
nized profession, all of those practicing
professionals should hold the degree of
their profession; that those without the
degree should not be licensed to pub
licly practice; and, that there be, gen
erally, the realization that the profes
sion should standardize itself along the
lines of other professions, which gen
eral American custom has set and ap
proved for professional organization,
plan, method, and procedure, modified
during the period of standardization, to
the extent that unfairness, injustice,
narrowness and turmoil may be
avoided.
BASIS OF VIEWS
In taking this stand the National
Association lays no claim to all ac

counting knowledge nor to be above
anyone else in ability or wisdom. The
officers of the Association merely claim
to have been in a position, as profes
sionals—not political office holders, in
the one place in all the whole country
in which such a thing is possible, to
observe the complete result of the ag
gregate effect of the activities of ac
countants all over this country, certi
fied and uncertified. This position of
observation is in the Income Tax Unit
of The United States Government,
where under the Income and Profits
Tax Laws, statements and reports of
all the business activities of the whole
country, personal and organized, flow
in, and where the results of the activi
ties of the accountant in connection
therewith, can be completely observed
—a position from which, not only the
activities flowing in to the Government
can be observed but the attitude of the
Government itself toward the profes
sion of accountancy and its valuation of
the accountant can be obtained. This
opportunity, afforded the officers of the
National Association for observation,
together with the concensus of views,
contributed to them as Officers of the
National Association, by members, and
by accountants generally throughout
the whole country since the organiza
tion of the National Association, give
them, as it would give any other ac
countant, the picture of the condition of
the profession, which allows of no other
reasonable stand than that taken by
the National Association and presented
in the columns of the Bulletin.

SAMPLE LETTER
Sample of letter the National Asso
ciation is receiving from all over the
country:
Mr. J. R. H. Hutchinson, Pres., Na
tional Association of Certified Public
Accountants, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
I take this occasion to express my
approval of many of the comments con
tained in Bulletin No. 2, particularly
the statement regarding the unfairness
of the present laws pertaining to C. P.
A. license in the various states.
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As pointed out, to obtain a C. P. A.
license at the present time is practically
beyond the reach of thousands of
worthy accountants, in spite of the
fact that they are thoroughly qualified
in every respect to practice as licensed
accountants. I am, therefore, very
glad to see that the Association has
taken a liberal attitude in this matter,
both in regard to the type of the ex
amination given and in other respects.
In view of the fact there are at the
present so many different accountancy
boards functioning in the different
states, and the conflict arising between
the board of one state and of that of
another, it has occurred to me that you
have now made a step in the right di
rection to place the Accountancy pro
fession before the country in a proper
light.
What is your opinion about having a
bill introduced in Congress which will
control the issuance of Federal licenses
in place of the various state certificates?
In this way, it appears to me that the
disgraceful conditions, now restricting
a good many worthy accountants from
assuming their proper places in the pro
fession, will be done away with. I
also agree with you that accountants
as a body have been holding a very
narrow view of the profession in so far
as their belief that by restricting the
number of certified public accountants
to a favored few, that they can best
benefit themselves. To me it seems
that a better way to make the ac
countancy profession one of the fore
most in the country is to open the
doors to every person capable of prac
ticing intelligently, and whose charac
ter, of course, will warrant such prac
tice.
The proper remedy is not to restrict
the number but to create a demand for
the services of the professional account
ant. This can be done only if account
ants are more numerous and better
organized so that they can carry on an
educational campaign for the benefit of
the business man and make him see the
importance of the accountant in the
light of a business advisor.
I am at present urging all my friends
practicing accounting, whom I think
worthy of membership, to send in their
applications.
Very truly yours,
HERMAN TEADORE.
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THE CURRENT CONDITION OF
THE PROFESSION
There is no profession in the coun
try today which approaches the Pro
fession of Accountancy in the current
existing condition of chaos, discord,
disagreement and narrow-minded self
ish objective within the profession. It
is a painful thing to have to announce
but the National Association feels that
it is necessary. If the profession is to
maintain its existence as a profession
and if it expects to continue to com
mand public respect, no matter how
painful it may be, it is vitally necessary
that the professional situation be vis
ualized for what it actually is in order
that those who are its members may
come to their senses and to some con
structive generally accepted and accept
able basis of understanding among
themselves with which they may stand
united before the public, not united by
States, not united by Associations or
Organizations, but united as a Na
tional profession. No organization, as
full of internal strife and bickerings as
is the profession of Accountancy, can
hope to have the wide and important
influence in the economic affairs of the
nation that the profession of Account
ancy should have while it is in its pres
ent condition of internal chaos. The
principal common activity of the ac
countant speaking in the general sense,
is knocking other accountants, by
States, by organizations and by indi
viduals, which is WRONG—ALL
WRONG. We are today the greatest
advertising medium against ourselves
that could be devised. We have lost
all sight of the fact that a discredited
accountant is a discredited accountant,
whether he be of Maine or California,
and that we all share, being account
ants ourselves, in the lessened public
regard for the accountant generally,
which is the net outcome of the indi
vidual discredit. We sneer at account
ants by States—we sneer at them by or
ganizations, and we sneer at each other
individually, and we wonder if the busi
ness world and the people sneer at us.
There seems to be no way but our way,
no standard but our standard, and that
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way and standard of ours can only be
successfully attained by very few, and
even those are not quite up to us. We
have our standards in the clouds, each
on his own cloud at that, but the trou
ble is there is no connection between
cloud and cloud, nor from the clouds
to the ground—and, unfortunately, we
do our business on the ground. We
must be practical—we can’t go along
with our heads in the air without a
great big bump coming to us. This
statement of condition is, we think, not
overdrawn. We have Accountants held
into court in New York City by other
Accountants; we have meetings in
Connecticut by the A. I. A. against the
National Association; we have a law
suit in North Carolina by North Caro
lina Accountants against North Caro
lina Accountants; we have the National
Association taking out an injunction
against the State Board of North Caro
lina; we have that board passing first
a scurrilous resolution against the Na
tional and later being forced to rescind
it; we have a court decision which in
validates many State Certificates and
casts a cloud on many others; we have
Accountants meeting in Chicagoagainst
Accountants elsewhere; we have Ac
countants’ threats against Accountants
almost from every State and against
every State and private organization.
Here at the National Capital where
peace and the spirit of Christmas is in
the air generally, there is no peace
coming in from all the land to or for
accountants. It is shocking to be in the
position where all this discord registers.
Something must be done if we, as Ac
countants, are to retain our self-respect
and the respect of others, and the first
thing to do is to realize the seriousness
of the situation which the National As
sociation attempts to show here and by
other articles in the Bulletin; and then
to make a professional New Year reso
lution that, while we have our own
opinions and stand on them, yet we will
fight for the profession as a profession,
and for professionals as professionals,
and in charity, justice and with open
mind, realizing that we may be wrong
and others may be right, approach and

thrash out professional questions, not
in a spirit of animosity, as individuals,
but as integral parts of a whole, on the
welfare of which is dependent the wel
fare or all individually.

NORTH CAROLINA SQUABBLE

This Kind of Thing, of Course, Breeds
Public Confidence in Accountants.
As we know of no steps taken by the
State Board of Accountancy of North
Carolina to publicly announce the
wrong committed by it against the Na
tional Association of Certified Public
Accountants and its certified members,
the National Association is forced, in
order that the members of the profes
sion may know the truth in this case, to
state here that the State Board of
North Carolina was forced to rescind
the scurrilous resolution recently
passed by it and directed against the
National Association, and those holding
the Certificates of the Association, who
were also holders of Certificates of
North Carolina, or any other State, by
an injunction secured against it by the
National Association and by the action
of the Supreme Court ofthe Board’s
own State, which declared, in effect,
that (the State Board having previous
ly proclaimed that the National Asso
ciation’s certificate was worthless and
delusive), the Certificates issued by the
State Board itself, in the name of the
sovereign State of North Carolina, on
its Washington examinations, were not
only worthless and delusive, but abso
lutely invalid.
WE HATE TO FIGHT
The National Association is not at
all pleased that it has had to take this
action—it likes to feel that, while it may
have differences in opinion with State
Boards or any others in the profession,
as to the best procedure for the best
interests of the profession, it can iron
out these differences in a dignified way,
as professional to professional, without
any quarrel whatsoever, in court or
otherwise, and it only hopes that it may
not be again forced to such a course in
the future.
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RESCINDED RESOLUTION
(An instructive resolution passed and
rescinded by the State Board whose
certificates actually were delusive and
worthless, being declared invalid on
an adverse decision of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina.)
Passed by North Carolina State Board
of Accountancy, at Meeting,
November 5, 1921
WHEREAS: Congress has not as
yet enacted a Certified Public Account
ant Law for the District of Columbia,
such as has been adopted by each of
all the States of the Union; and

WHEREAS: There appears to be
no Laws, either Federal or State, that
forbid any resident of the District of
Columbia from calling himself a Cer
tified Public Accountant, whether or
not he is an Accountant; nor does
there appear to be any District Law
that directly forbids any person, firm,
association, or corporation from en
gaging in the business of issuing the
Degree of Certified Public Accountant,
or any other Degree; and

WHEREAS:
The investigation
made by this Board has disclosed that
there is a Private Corporation, which
has been recently incorporated under
the laws of the District of Columbia,
located in Washington, D. C., known
as “The National Association of Cer
tified Public Accountants,” whose pur
pose, according to the third paragraph
of its Charter, is to issue the Degree
of Certified Public Accountant; and
WHEREAS: The said private Cor
poration appears to be now engaged
in the business of issuing Degrees of
Certified Public Accountant, for the
sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) each; and
it further appears that said private
Corporation is extensively advertising
and soliciting customers by presenting
—among other things—a claim that it
has a “waiver” clause, under which a
person may procure his or her De
gree without examination; Be it there
fore

RESOLVED: That it is the unani
mous opinion of the North Carolina

State Board of Accountancy, from the
information now before it, that the
private Corporation known as “The
National Association of Certified Pub
lic Accountants,” Washington, D. C.,
is engaged in the practice or business
of issuing or granting Degrees of Cer
tified Public Accountant; that it is
further the opinion of this Board that
the said private Corporation is operat
ing in this respect without authority
from either Federal or State Laws,
other than what is given under the
general private Corporation Laws of
the District of Columbia; Be it fur
ther

RESOLVED: That the Certificates
that said private Corporation has
granted and is issuing, purporting to
be Degrees of Certified Public Ac
countant, are in our opinion, delusive
and worthless; Be it further
RESOLVED: That it is the unani
mous opinion of the North Carolina
State Board of Accountancy that any
person who holds an unrevoked Certifi
cate as Certified Public Accountant un
der the Laws of the State of North
Carolina, or any other State, and who
is aiding or abetting the business or
practice of the said “National Associa
tion of Certified Public Accountants;”
Washington, D. C., by being con
nected with said corporation, either as
an officer or member thereof, or as a
holder of one of their certificates of
“Certified Public Accountant,” consti
tutes an offense in professional ethics
sufficient for revoking his or her cer
tificate granted under the laws of this
or any other State; and be it further

RESOLVED: That the Secretary
of this Board is hereby instructed to
notify legally each and every officer
and member of the said “National As
sociation of Certified Public Account
ants,” who holds a certified public ac
countant’s certificate granted by the
North Carolina State Board of Ac
countancy, to appear before this board,
Saturday, December 10, 1921, at the
office of Major J. J. Bernard, Secre
tary, in the Wake County Courthouse,
Raleigh, N. C., to show cause why his
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or her certificate should not be re
voked, in accordance with Section 7022
of Chapter 110 of the Consolidated
Statutes of North Carolina.
J. J. BERNARD,
Secretary.

THE NEW YORK SQUABBLE
The following is a copy of a brief
filed in a magistrate’s court. The case
at bar brings a C. P. A. (N. Y.) vs.
“C. P. A.’s” (N. H.), another fine ex
hibition for the public, inspiring gen
eral respect for and confidence in the
profession:

In the Matter of the Complaint of
H. ELY GOLDSMITH
—Against—
VARIOUS DEFENDANTS
For Violation of Section 80 of the
General Business Law.
Brief Submitted by
SIMON M. PLATT
as Amici Curae of the Court.
POINT I

Public Accountancy has not been
created a profession. There is no pro
hibition against the practice of account
ancy by individuals, even though they
have not received a C. P. A. degree.
Differentiating this act from the act
prohibiting the practice by an indi
vidual citizen from practicing law,
medicine, dentistry and kindred pro
fessions.
This section to wit: Section 80 of
the General Business Law is similar to
the law creating the title of R. A. to
wit: Registered Architect.
That act, the creation of the title of
R. A., did not and does not prohibit a
man from practicing the profession of
architect in the State of New York, nor
does it limit it just to those who have
received the degree of R. A.
POINT II

The act itself to wit: Section 80 of
the General Business Law, recognizes
the fact that the sister states of the
United States of America have created
C. P. A. degrees or designations. As
a matter of fact, every state of the
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United States has created C. P. A.
Degrees, regulations and standards.
The custom of reciprocity is given
due consideration in this act by making
provisions for the granting of a C.
P. A. degree in this State to one who
has received such a degree from a sister
State. The intent of the legislature
clearly was not to prohibit C. P. A.’s
of other States from practicing in New
York as many of our C. P. A.’s have
national activities and such a course
plight invite retaliation.
POINT III
The defendant at bar has not contra
vened section 80 of the General Busi
ness Law because of the fact that the
said defendant has held himself forth
as a C. P. A. (NH) which is clearly an
indication that he is a certified public
accountant of the State of New Hamp
shire and which is a clear indication
that he does not hold himself out or
represent himself to be a C. P. A. of
the State of New York, nor did he hold
himself out or represent himself to
have received a C. P. A. degree from
the Regents of the University of the
State of New York.
The act only prohibits the using of
the words C. P. A. or other words, let
ters or figures to indicate that the per
son using the same is a certified public
accountant who has received a degree
from the Regents of the University of
the State of New York.
POINT IV
There is nothing contained in the
said section 80 of the General Busi
ness Law that prohibits a person from
holding himself out or representing
himself to be a C. P. A. of the State of
N. H. or any other State or using the
abbreviation C. P. A. (NH) or C. P. A.
designating any other State after such
initials and there is no prohibition
against
an
individual
practicing
accountancy under any designation
whatsoever excepting that unqualified
designation specified in this act to wit:
C. P. A. or certified public accountant.
Respectfully submitted,
SIMON M. PLATT, Attorney,

City and Post Office Address:
908 Brook Avenue,
Bronx, New York City.

COURT DECISION COMMENT
Very interesting questions, vitally
important to the Accountants con
cerned, have been raised by the decision
recently rendered by the Supreme
Court in North Carolina, which is car
ried in this issue, of the Bulletin.
Among them is the question as to the
legality of the acts of various State
Boards in issuing Certificates to Ac
countants on examination outside of
the boundaries of the various States
and the question of the validity of the
actions of the various Boards based
upon their relationship with the Ameri
can Institute of Accountants in the
matter of giving examinations and rat
ing papers which amounts to the judg
ment of qualifications, after the ex
amination has been given. The Na
tional Association has not yet gone
into these questions deeply enough to
render an intelligent opinion on this
matter and is merely calling attention
at this time to possibilities under the
decision that may be very serious, in
what the Court says, bearing on this
subject, as follows:
“It is an established rule that when
the means for the exercise of a granted
power are given, no other or different
means can be implied, as being more
effective or convenient.” * * * “And
the duties pertaining to the office can
not be delegated to others.” * * *
“The conclusion is inevitable that the
field for the discharge of the functions
of the State Board of Accountancy is
not the whole world, but only ‘Such
places within the State as the Board
may designate’ ” * * * “The law is un
mistakably clear that the legislature
has no power to enact statutes, even
though in general words, that can ex
tend in their operation and effect be
yond the territory of the sovereignty
from which the statute emanates. The
legislative authority of every State
must spend its force within the terri
torial limits of the State.”
It will be noted that the question as
to the character of legislation, which
C. P. A. legislation generally repre
sents, was not developed in the North
Carolina case. As both the defendant

and the plaintiff happened to be in
agreement upon this point and set
forth that this legislation was not spe
cial legislation but was in the general
public interest, the court apparently
accepted the matter in this light, no
issue in this respect being raised in the
case, and assumed that the State had
acted in the lawful exercise of its police
power “to safeguard the public
against
incompetent
accountants.”
(Note that the court uses the word
accountants, not certified public ac
countants, which would appear to indi
cate that court had in mind that all
accountants, practicing publicly, were
certified under the act), it apparently
being beyond any reasonable concep
tion of the court (and rightfully) that
any other condition could exist and
that the public was absolutely unpro
tected from the “accountant” by this
law in that an overwhelming majority
of accountants, practicing publicly, did
not come under the restrictions of this
kind of law at all but were practicing
freely and uncontrolled The court
simply could not visualize the police
power, to use an extreme illustration,
being used, merely to certify honest
men, as such, and to allow the burglar
to operate uncontrolled.

EXAMINATIONS
The National Association held ex
aminations in Chicago, on Thursday
and Friday, December 8th and 9th; and
in New York, on December 15th and
16th. These examinations were very
well attended and successful in every
respect. Not a figure was used in any
of the examinations thereby illustrating
the National Association’s viewpoint of
the difference between the Accountant
and the Comptometer, Bookkeeper,
Junior Accountant, Statistician, and
Actuary and showing that the Ac
countant’s particular function is the
dealing with accounts and items in ac
counts and with other records to detect
the truth, leaving to others less skilled
in accounts and of more mechanical
function to denominate the degree of
truth by placing thereupon the numeri
cal value. A copy of the Chicago ex
amination will be enclosed with this
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copy of the Bulletin as it will be in
teresting to accountants, not especially
from the standpoint of the problem,
which is merely a double consolida
tion, but as to the form in which the
problem is presented, which leaves
everything to the analytical ability of
the examinee, his power of deduction
based upon relative values as shown
by accounts and deficiencies of ac
counts and, generally, his power to
read correctly the story of business as
shown in the language of the
accountant.

“C. P. A.” Law
Note—Salient features of decision have
been printed in capitals.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH CAROLINA, FALL
TERM, 1921
State on the relation of the Attorney
General and D. H. McCullough,

George G. Scott and others, constitu
ting the State Board of Accountancy.
No. 443, Mecklenburg
Appeal from Mecklenburg—Ray J.,
presiding.
This action was brought by the
plaintiff, who is a duly certified Public
Accountant, to enjoin the defendants
from exercising certain of their duties
beyond the limits of the State, and,
to be more exact, from examining ap
plicants for licenses and certificates to
practice, as Public Accountants, beyond
the State and in the City of Wash
ington, D. C.
The case was tried below on de
murrer to the complaint and the mo
tion to vacate a restraining order there
tofore granted. The court sustained the
demurrer and vacated the restraining
order, and refused a preliminary in
junction to the final hearing. Plain
tiff appealed.
COCHRAN & BEAM and CARRIE
L. McLEAN, for Plaintiff.
E. R. PRESTON and JAMES A.
LOCKHARD, for Defendant.
WALKER, J. (after stating the
case):

The State Board of Accountancy
was created by special act of the Legis
lature of 1913, the act being Chapter
157 of the Public Laws of 1913,
brought forward in the Consolidated
Statutes as Chapter 116, sections 7008
to 7024, inclusive. The function of this
Board is to examine applicants and
grant certificates, as Certified Public
Accountants of the State of North
Carolina, to those giving evidence by
such examination that they are quali
fied. The statute provides (C. S. 7010)
that: “The Board shall determine the
qualifications of persons applying for
certificates under this chapter, and
make rules for the examination of ap
plicants and the issue of certificates
herein provided.” The statute further
provides (C. S. 7016): “The examina
tion shall be held as often as may be
necessary in the opinion of the board,
and at such times and places as it may
designate, but not less frequently than
in each calendar year.”
Before entering upon a discussion of
the merits, we will first consider a pre
liminary question based upon the mo
tion of the plaintiff in this Court to
make the Attorney General a party as
co-plaintiff, so that the title of the case
shall be “The State on the relation of
the Attorney General and D. H.
McCullough,” as plaintiffs, against the
present defendants. The defendants
resist the granting of this motion on
the ground that the amendment here
will deprive them of the benefit of their
second ground of demurrer taken be
low, that plaintiff had no right to bring
this action and that this Court will not
allow an amendment, when such a re
sult will follow. This is true generally
as the cases cited by the defendants
show. West v. Railway, 140 N. C.,
620; Bonner v. Stotesbury, 139 N. C.,
3; Wilson v. Pearson, 102 N. C., 290;
Grant v. Rogers, 94 N. C., 755. And
they further contend, that it would sub
stitute a new cause of action. If we
could see that such would be the re
sult, and that defendants would be
prejudiced thereby, we might deny the
motion, but it does not so appear to
us. The plaintiff has some interest in
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the cause of action, as a member of
the class for whose benefit this law was
enacted, and is subject to the general
supervision of its Board and its official
bodies, and also he has such interest
as a citizen and taxpayer, in seeing
that funds, in which the public have
an interest, should not be diverted to
an illegal purpose, or squandered for
unauthorized purposes, and more espe
cially he has an interest in requiring
that funds raised for the support of
this quasi public body, they being
trustees of the class of which he is a
member, should not be unlawfully ex
pended by the Board, but should be
held by it to subserve the special ob
jects for which it was created. But,
however this may be, and it is not
necessary that we should definitely de
cide it, this Court has allowed the
amendments requested, which are in
the interest of a hearing of the case
upon its real merits, and in accordance
with, at least, one of our former de
cisions, when a similar amendment was
ordered here. Forte v. Boone, 114
N. C., 176 (op. by the present Chief
Justice). There it was held, as the
syllabus of the case shows, that where
an action was brought on the official
bond of a clerk of the Superior Court
in the name of the parties injured by
a breach thereof, it was not error in
the Court below to permit an amend
ment of the summons by the insertion
of the words “The State on relation of”
after the pleadings were filed. The
court, in the opinion, says with respect
to this holding: “We may note, how
ever, that the exception to the Judge’s
allowing the summons to be amended
by adding the words “State on rela
tion of” before the name of plaintiff,
was not error. Maggett v. Roberts,
108 N. C., 174. It might have even
been allowed after verdict (Brown v.
Mitchell, 102 N. C., 347), or, indeed,
IN THIS COURT,” citing Hodge v.
Railroad, 108 N. C., 24, 26; Grant v.
Rogers, 94 N. C., 755; Tyrrell v. Sim
mons, 48 N. C., 187; The Code, sec.
965.
We then have a case, in the name of
the State upon the relation of its At
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torney General and D. H. McCullough
against the defendants, to enjoin the
violation by the latter of the law creat
ing them, wherein it is alleged that
they have committed an ultra vires act,
and to the extent that, if they may pay
their expenses in the doing of the
alleged unlawful act, they will mis
apply the trust fund established by the
statute for the lawful costs and ex
penses of the Board, and thereby are
diminishing the amount which should
go into the public treasury by the
terms of the law, which provides in
Consol, Statutes, sec. 7019, that after
paying expenses, “any surplus arising
shall, at the end of each year, be de
posited by the treasurer of the board
with the state treasurer to the credit of
the general fund.”
The Consol.
Statutes, sec. 1143, entitled “Actions by
the Attorney General to prevent ultra
vires acts by corporations,” provides:
In the following cases the attorney
general may, in the name of the State,
upon his own information or upon the
complaint of a private party, bring an
action against the offending parties for
the purpose of:
1. Restraining by injunction a corpo
ration from assuming or exercising any
franchise or transacting any business
not allowed by its charter.
2. Restraining any person from exer
cising corporate franchises not granted.
3. Bringing directors, managers, and
officers of a corporation, or the trustees
of funds given for a public or chari
table purpose, to an account for the
management and disposition of the
property confided to their care.
4. Removing such officers or trustees
upon proof of gross misconduct.
5. Securing, for the benefit of all in
terested, the said property or funds.
6. Setting aside and restraining im
proper alienations of the said property
or funds.
7. Generally compelling the faithful
performance of duty and preventing all
fraudulent practices, embezzlement,
and waste.
To restrain corporations from ultra
vires acts, and which was applicable
where purpose was not to dissolve cor

THE C. P. A. BULLETIN

poration, as under section 1187, but to
preserve it in its useful functions with
out abuse of powers. Attorney Gen
eral v. R. R., 28 N. C., 456. This sec
tion embodies provisions of Rev. Code,
Chapter 26, section 28; Rev. Statutes
Ch. 26, sec. 10; Acts of 1831, Ch. 24,
sec. 5, which authorized injunction pro
ceedings in a court of equity.
The authority, given by the statute,
as approved by this court, would seem
to be ample justification for granting
the relief prayed for by plaintiff in this
action. The Attorney General is doing
only what the statute permits him to
do in the interest of the public, of his
own motion, or upon the complaint of
a private party.
Having disposed of this preliminary
question, we proceed to consider the
case upon its merits. It must be stead
ily kept in mind that we are now deal
ing with an overruled demurrer, and
we can consider only the facts alleged
in the complaint (which are to be taken
as admitted), and no extraneous mat
ter. Hartsfield v. Bryan, 177 N. C.,
166; Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C., 467;
Wood v. Kincaid, 144 N. C., 393.
We are firmly convinced that the
statute, under which the defendants
professed to hold this examination,
does not authorize them to perform
their duties, and exercise their func
tions, outside the State, and that, on
the contrary, it requires them to con
fine their activities strictly within its
limits. We do not suppose, for an in
stant, it will be controverted, that de
fendants are public officers. The board
created by the Act is, at least, a quasi
public corporation, required to dis
charge certain public duties, and re
sponsibilities to the State and bound
for their proper, and legal perform
ance, and also for the care and admin
istration of the funds they handle, the
surplus of which, not used for defray
ing the Board’s expenses, being re
quired to be deposited in the State
Treasury. In Groves v. Barden, 169
N. C., 8, our Court defines the word
“officers,” and refers with approval to
the case of Attorney General v. Tillinghast, 17 A. & E. Annotated Cases, 452.

These cases, with the authorities there
in collected, and the later authorities
given in the notes to Groves v. Barden
in Ann. Cas. 1917 D, p. 316, furnish us
the indicia by which we determine
whether a given position is or is not
an “office.” Applying to the State
Board of Accountancy the tests laid
down in the cases, we find that the
Board was directly created by the Leg
islature; the qualifications of its mem
bers are prescribed by law—all to be
residents of the State, three to be
actively engaged as Certified Public
Accountants of this State, one to be a
lawyer of the State in good standing;
the treasurer is required to give bond;
the funds belong to the State after the
expenses of the office are paid; there
is entrusted to this Board some of the
sovereign authority of the State, it be
ing an arm of the State Government;
the duties are not merely clerical, or
those of agents or servants, but are
performed in the execution and admin
istration of the law, in the exercise of
power and authority bestowed by the
law; they are appointed by the Gov
ernor; the people of the State at large
are concerned in the performance of
their official acts; their compensation
is derived from fees fixed by law; they
are not under contract with the State,
either as to their duties or their com
pensation; the law fixes the duration
of their term of office; such discretion
ary power is granted and such judg
ment required in the exercise of the
functions for which the Board WAS
CREATED AS TO RENDER THE
OFFICIAL ACTS OF ITS MEM
BERS
QUASI-JUDICIAL;
the
duties are continuing in their nature,—
i. e., they are to be regularly per
formed; AND THE DUTIES PER
TAINING TO THE OFFICE CAN
NOT
BE
DELEGATED
TO
OTHERS. The certificates granted
by the Board constitute a license to
practice as Certified Public Account
ants within the State. The position
held by each of the defendants com
plies with all the tests prescribed in
State Ex. Rel. Attorney General v.
Noland Knight, 169 N. C., 333.

THE C. P. A. BULLETIN

In 22 R. C. L. 396, boards of educa
tion boards of legal examiners, and
boards of equalization of taxes, are
mentioned as among various well
known instances of boards of public
officers. It is admitted that the juris
diction of the Board is statewide, and
if the members arc officers, they are,
therefore, State Officers. The plain
tiff contends, and it is true, that the
jurisdiction of State officers is only
co-extensive with the territory of the
State from which they derive their
powers. “It is apparent that in strict
ness a mere license or power conferred
by statute is only co-extensive with the
sovereignty from which the license or
power emanates.” 17 R. C. L. 502.
“State officers are those whose duties
concern the State at large, or the gen
eral public, although exercised within
defined limits, and to whom are dele
gated the exercise of a portion of the
sovereign power of the State. They
are in a general sense those whose
powers and duties are co-extensive
with the State,” 36 Cyc., 852. In State
v. Hocker, 63 Am. Rep., 174, after re
citing very fully the attributes neces
sary to constitute an officer, it was held
that without any semblance of doubt
the members of the board of legal ex
aminers were State officers, the field
for the exercise of whose jurisdiction,
duties and powers, was co-extensive
only with the limits of the State.
It cannot be said that “co-extensive
with State Boundaries” means more
than the words imply, that is so con
tradictory that the mere statement of
it is seemingly absurd. The word
“jurisdiction” embraces not only the
subject matter coming within the pow
ers of officials, but also the territory
within which the powers are to be
exercised. (State v. Magney (Neb.),
72 N. W., 1006, 1008). The question
as to jurisdiction must be considered
with reference to the territory within
which it is to be exercised. (Konold v.
Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. (Utah), 51
Pac. 256). Jurisdiction is defined to be
the “power to hear and determine
causes.” The hearing is as important
a part of jurisdiction as the determin

ing. The power of officials to act as
fixed and limited by the place of per
formance, is discussed in the case of
State v. Dolan, 72 Miss., 960, 18 So.,
387, and particularly in the notes to the
same case in 33 L. R. A., 85. While
it is true that in most of the cases re
ferred to in these notes some place for
performance was designated in the
statute, still in the case of Ex parte
Branch, 63 Ala., 383, cited in this con
nection, it is said: “If the law should
not, however, appoint a place for the
sitting of the Court, it would doubtless
rest in the power of the judge to ap
point the time and place of the sitting;
and the only limitation of the power
would be, that the place should be
within the territory of his jurisdiction.”
In Ferebee v. Hinton, 102 N. C., 99,
the Clerk of the Court of Camden
County, North Carolina, went to Vir
ginia, and took the examination and
acknowledgement of the parties to a
deed of trust on land in North Carolina,
but did not write out his certificate
and sign it until he returned to Cam
den County, North Carolina. The
Court said: That the deed was void as
to the wife, if the Clerk of the Superior
Court of Camden County took her
privy examination in the State of Vir
ginia cannot be denied, and it is un
necessary to cite authority in support
of such a plain proposition as to the
admissibility of the evidence; as to the
other point, it is equally clear that the
Clerk had no jurisdiction when he took
the privy examination in the State of
Virginia.” This case is cited with ap
proval in Long v. Crews, 113 N. C.,
256, in which the present Chief Justice
wrote the opinion, and in which he
says: “In this State it is settled law
that an acknowledgement of a deed by
the husband and privy examination of
the wife taken before a Justice of the
Peace, Commissioner, or Notary, is a
judicial, or at least, a quasi-judicial act,
and if such officer is not authorized to
take it, the probate and registration are
invalid against creditors and pur
chasers. * * * The principle has since
been followed in Todd v. Outlaw, 79
N. C., 235; Duke v. Markham, 105
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N. C., 131, and many other cases.
* * * These were all cases where the
registration and probate were insuffi
cient because the acknowledgement
was made before an officer, by reason
of his locality, not authorized or acting
outside of his local jurisdiction, and the
ruling is sustained by ample authority
elsewhere, 1 Am. & Eng. Enc., 146,
note 2, and 1 Devlin on Deeds, Secs.
487 and 488, with cases cited. * * *
The acknowledgement is taken, so to
speak, CORAM NON JUDICE, and
cannot authorize probate by the clerk
and registration,” citing authorities.
Acts of a school officer must generally
be performed at the times and places
designated by law, or they will be in
valid; and, generally speaking, they
must be performed within the territory
over which the officer’s jurisdiction ex
tends; 24 R. C. L. 578.
In Pardrige v. Morgenthau, 157 Ill.,
395, the judge out of court and off the
bench approved an appeal bond, and di
rected it to be filed NUNC PRO
TUNC, and it was decided to be in
valid. In Bear v. Cohen, 65 N. C., 511,
it was held that a Judge appointed by
the Governor to hold court in Wilson
and Craven Counties, did not have
jurisdiction to act in cases pending in
other counties of the district—specific
ally, to set aside an attachment in
Wayne County. In State v. Jefferson,
76 N. C., 309, the Judge left the Court
in Warren County before the jury
agreed on a verdict, and went to his
home in the adjoining county of Frank
lin, where he was advised by telegraph
that the jury could not agree. He in
structed the Clerk by wire to discharge
the jury and remand the prisoner. Dis
cussing error in the exercise of power
by the Court (the validity of his act
as affected by the place of its perform
ance), it was held to be the duty of the
Judge that he should be personally
present in Court, and therefore his act
was illegal, and the prisoner was en
titled to his discharge. When in 1913
our legislature enacted a curative
statute
validating
probates
and
acknowledgements taken prior to 1913
by officers out of the county, or dis

12

trict, authorized by law, only such pro
bates or acknowledgments were vali
dated as had been taken within the
State. Laws 1913, Ch. 125, C. S. 3336.
In Re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 10 L. R.
A., 790, it was said that “no issue was
made with the definition usually given
that a Court consists of persons offi
cially assembled under authority of
law, at the appropriate time and place
for the administration of justice, nor
was it denied that the place of meeting
was an important element in the
definition.”
It is elementary that when the law
confers upon a person powers that he
as a natural person does not possess,
power cannot accompany his person
beyond the bounds of the sovereignty
which has conferred the power. For
example, letters testamentary or of ad
ministration have no legal effect be
yond the territorial limits of the State
in which they are granted. An execu
tor or administrator cannot sue in his
official capacity in the courts of any
other State than that from which he
derives his authority to act in virtue of
the letters there granted to him, be
cause his appointment stops at the
boundary of the State which appointed
him, 11 R. C. L., pp. 432-447. He must
resort to ancillary administration in the
other State. A State may have extra
territorial officers, such as commission
ers to take acknowledgments of deed
in other States and territories, but such
cases are clearly exceptional, 22 R. C.
L., 405. The same familiar principle
that forbids court officials, executors,
administrators and guardians from act
ing in their official capacity beyond the
State boundaries, is applied in the case
of corporations. In the case of Miller
v. Ewen, 27 Maine, 509, 46 Am. Dec.,
619, it was held that a general clause
in a charter authorizing certain persons
to call the first meeting of a corpora
tion at such time and place as they
think proper, does not authorize them
to call the meeting at a place without
the State. Numerous cases may be
cited to establish the general principle
that meetings of corporations for the
performance of corporate acts must be
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held within the State creating the cor
poration, 14 Cor. Jur., 886 and 7 R. C.
D., 335. Our own State has enacted
this principle into the statute, i. e.,
that meetings of stockholders must be
held within the State. The reason
given for this rule is that in the per
formance of corporate acts, the corpo
ration shall be at all times under the
supervision and control of the laws of
the State creating the corporation. If
this be true of private corporations, A
FORTIORI is it true of an army of
the State government, a body corpo
rate to whom has been entrusted the
performance of a governmental duty
designated to protect the people of the
State against unskilled and incompe
tent persons in a profession for which
the State has seen fit to fix standards
of proficiency before admission to
practice.
As has been said, “jurisdiction” in
volves the hearing as well as the deter
mining of matters to be decided—in
deed, the hearing of the matter is the
basis for the determination. The giv
ing of examinations for determining
the the qualifications of applicants is
not a mere incidental or ministerial
duty such as might be delegated by the
State Board of Accountancy to other
persons, but is a judicial or quasi
judicial duty required to be performed
by the members of the Board them
selves, and in order further to safe
guard the public, certain standards of
skill are required of the examiners.
The plaintiff contends that the submis
sion and the supervision of the holding
of the examination, and the determina
tion of the qualifications of applicants,
constitute one official act, requiring
such judgment and discretion as to
render it judicial or quasi-judicjal in
character; that it is the performing of
a function of government designed to
benefit the people of the State; and
therefore, in going beyond the bounda
ries of the State to perform this func
tion, the Board would exceed its juris
diction. It seems superfluous to cite
other authorities than those already
cited from our own court in Ferebee v.
Hinton, 102 N. C., 99, and in Long v.

Crews, 113 N. C., 256, either as to the
judicial character of the official acts of
the Board of Accountancy, or as to the
place where these acts may be per
formed. The comparatively simple act
of taking the acknowledgments and ex
amination of grantors in a deed, by a
Notary, Commissioner, Justice of the
Peace, or Clerk, has been repeatedly
held by this Court, to be judicial, not
only in the cases cited above, but in
State v. Knight, 169 N. C., 333; Paul v.
Carpenter, 70 N. C., 508; White v.
Conelly, 105 N. C., 68; Piland v.
Taylor, 113 N. C., 1, and others.
Bishop on Non-Contract Laws, sec.
785, 786, says, that quasi-judicial func
tions are those which lie midway be
tween the judicial and the ministerial
ones. The lines, separating them from
such as are on their two sides, are
necessarily indistinct but in general
terms, when the law, in words or by
implication, commits to any officer the
duty of looking into facts, and acting
upon them, not in a way which it
specifically directs, but after a discre
tion in its nature judicial, the function
is termed quasi-judicial. In 18 R. C. L.
294, in discussing the extent to which a
board of examiners may be controlled
in granting professional licenses, the
discretionary power to pass on qualifi
cations is termed “judicial,” and in
every case where the acts complained
of constituted an abuse of discretion or
an excess of jurisdiction, it is held that
the courts should intervene to enforce
or enjoin, as the circumstances might
be. In 22 R. C. L., 383, it is said, that
certain officers are considered quasijudicial, as for example, members of a
board of pilot commissioners, to whom
the law has entrusted certain duties,
the performance of which requires the
exercise of judgment. In Bonar v.
Adams, Auditor, and Jenkins, Treas
urer, 65 N. C., 639, it was held that the
State Auditor is not a mere ministerial
officer, but exercises discretionary pow
ers. It was held in Ex Parte Garland,
4 Wall. (U. S.) 333, at 378, that the
admission and exclusion of attorneys
is the exercise of judicial power, and
had been so held in numerous cases at
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that time. This has been approved in
numerous later decisions referred to in
Rose’s Notes, Vol. 6, p. 55. In Troop
on Public Officers, pp. 507 et seq., it is
said, that although an officer may not
in strictness be a judge, still, if his
powers are discretionary, to be exerted
or withheld according to his own view
of what is necessary and proper, they
are in their nature judicial. Where a
power rests in judgment or discretion,
so that it is of a judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the
exercise of the functions of a judge,
or is conferred upon an officer other
than a judicial officer, the expression
used is generally “quasi-judicial.” It
is a general and sound principle, that
when ever the law vests any person
with a power to do an act, and consti
tutes him a judge of the evidence on
which the act may be done; and, at
the same time, contemplates that the
act is to be carried into effect through
the instrumentality of agents; the per
son thus clothed with power is in
vested with discretion, and is QUOAD
HOC a judge.
BY JUDICIAL
ACTION IS MEANT, IN LEGAL
UNDERSTANDING, THAT
WHICH REQUIRES THE EXER
CISE OF JUDGMENT OR DIS
CRETION BY ONE OR MORE
PERSONS, OR BY A CORPORATE
BODY, WHEN ACTING AS PUB
LIC OFFICERS, IN AN OFFICIAL
CHARACTER, AS SHALL SEEM
TO THEM TO BE EQUITABLE
AND JUST.
In State v. State Medical Examining
Board, 50 Am. Rep. (32) (Minn.) 575;
in People v. Dental Examiners, 110 Ill.,
180; in State v. Gregory, 83 Mo., 123,
53 Am. Rep. 565; in Williams v. Dental
Examiners (Tenn.) 27 S. W., 1019; and
many similar cases, it was held that ex
amining boards for physicians, dentists,
lawyers, and other professions, exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial powers; and in
all other cases, the courts addressed
themselves largely TO DETERMIN
ING WHETHER THE ACT COM
PLAINED OF WAS WITHIN OR
IN EXCESS, OR ABUSE, OF SUCH
POWERS; IF THE LATTER, IT

COULD BE ENJOINED OR EN
FORCED BY THE COURTS. In
the much-cited case of State v. Chitten
don (Wis.), 107 N. W., 500, at 516, it
is said that the law leaves the matter
(decision as to status of the college) to
the board, acting reasonably, the same
as similar matters are commonly left to
such agencies exercising quasi-judicial
authority. It contemplates that the
members o
f the board will proceed with
the dignity and fairness commonly ex
pected of tribunals exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial authority; that they
will act as a body; that they will act
upon proof of some sort reasonably ap
propriate to the case and made a mat
ter of record, not necessarily that they
will, in all cases, act regardless of per
sonal investigation, but that in case of
reliance thereon the result of the inves
tigation will be made a matter of rec
ord.......... In short, that they will
exercise their judicial function judi
ciously and that their decisions will be
open to review by the courts for juris
dictional error.
The general rule for the construc
tion of statutes, when applied to the
law under consideration, clearly indi
cate that the intention of the legisla
ture, and the object to be secured by
the performance of the duties presented
for the Board of Accountancy, require
that the words “at such places as it
may designate,” shall be construed to
mean “AT SUCH PLACES WITHIN
THE STATE AS IT MAY DESIG
NATE.” In construing a statute, it is
to be considered in its relation to other
law, as part of a general and uniform
system of jurisprudence, in connection
with other statutes on the same or cog
nate subjects, or even on different sub
jects. Where the language is of doubt
ful meaning, or adherence to the strict
letter would lead to injustice, the Court
gives a reasonable construction con
sistent with the general principles of
law. The spirit, or reason of the law,
prevails over its letter. The meaning
of general terms may be restrained by
the evident object or purpose to be at
tained, and general language may be
construed to admit implied exceptions,
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in order to accomplish what was mani
festly intended. It is proper to con
sider the occasion and the necessity for
its enactment, and that construction
should be given which is best calculated
to advance the object by suppressing
the mischief and securing the benefits
contemplated. If the purpose, and well
ascertained object of a statute, are in
consistent with the exact words, the
latter must yield to the controlling in
fluence of the legislative will resulting
from a consideration of the whole act.
A statute should not be extended be
yond the fair and reasonable meaning
of its terms because the legislature did
not use proper words to express its
meaning. Where the ordinary inter
pretation of a statute leads to conse
quences so dangerous and absurd that
they could never have been intended,
the Court, may adopt a construction
from analogous provisions and thus
supply an omission. Abernathy v.
Commissioners, 169 N. C., 631.
The above is a summary of some of
the general principles for the construc
tion of statutes as laid down in 36 Cyc.
1102 et seq., and many decisions, and
when applied to the statute under con
sideration in the case at bar, THE
CONCLUSION IS INEVITABLE
THAT THE FIELD FOR THE
DISCHARGE OF THE FUNC
TIONS OF THE STATE BOARD
OF ACCOUNTANCY IS NOT THE
WHOLE WORLD, BUT ONLY
“SUCH PLACES WITHIN THE
STATE AS THE BOARD MAY
DESIGNATE.” In State v. Ind. Co.
(Ark.) L. R. A., 348, in construing a
statute in which the word “any” oc
curred thirteen times in the first sec
tion, the Court held that, although the
legislature may use generally words
such as “any” or “all,” in describing
the persons or acts to which the statute
applies, still it does not follow that the
law has any extra territorial effect; for
it is presumed that the legislature did
not presume it to have such an exten
sive, or world-wide effect, unless the
language of the statute admits of no
other reasonable interpretation. Bond
v. Jay, 7 Cranch 351. The reports fur-
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nish numerous instances of the appli
cation of this rule, by which general
words used in statutes are taken as
limited to cases within the jurisdiction
of the legislature passing the statute,
and confining its operation to matters
affecting persons and property in such
jurisdiction. If it were necessary, hun
dreds of cases and statutes could be re
ferred to containing general words,
which are thus limited. Among the
vast number of cases construing such
statutes, it is doubtful if one can be
found in which such general words
have not been treated as limited to
some extent, for it is unusual for a
legislature to intend that its statutes
shall apply everywhere.
We have already referred to the law
of corporations as being a law on a
cognate subject. Even more closely
allied is our law as it relates to such
professions as law, medicine, etc. Until
1917, our statute did not prescribe
where the examinations for entrance to
the bar were to be held, and even now
the statute (C. S. 195) says that exam
inations for license to practice law may
be held in the city of Raleigh. Before
1917, the examiners for admission to
the bar did not construe their authority
to permit holding examinations outside
the State, nor since 1917 at any place
other than the city of Raleigh, even
though the word “may” sometimes im
plies discretion. Sec. 6609 Consolidated
Statutes prescribes that the board of
medical examiners shall meet in the
city of Raleigh. Sec. 6701 Consoli
dated Statutes prescribes that the
board of osteopathic examiners shall
meet in Raleigh in July of each year,
“and at such other times and places as
a majority of the board may designate.”
In our statutes, some discretion is per
mitted the various other boards of ex
aminers for dentists, pharmacists,
nurses, teachers, etc. In these cases,
however, we are not left to apply only
the general rules for the construction
of statutes. THE LAW IS UNMIS
TAKABLY CLEAR THAT THE
LEGISLATURE HAS NO POWER
TO ENACT STATUTES, EVEN
THOUGH IN GENERAL WORDS,
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THAT CAN EXTEND IN THEIR
OPERATION AND EFFECT BE
YOND THE TERRITORY OF
THE SOVEREIGNTY FROM
WHICH THE STATUTE EMAN
ATES. THE LEGISLATIVE AU
THORITY OF EVERY STATE
MUST SPEND ITS FORCE WITH
IN THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS
OF THE STATE. Cooley’s Cons.
Lim. p. 154. As a general rule, no law
has any effect of its own force beyond
the territorial limits of the sovereignty
from which its authority is derived. 25
R. C. L., 781; Hilton v. Guyot, 159
N. S., 113, 40 L. Ed. 95. Black on In
terpretation of Laws, p. 91, says:
“Prima facie, every statute is confined
in its operation to the persons, prop
erty, rights, or contracts, which are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
legislature which enacted it. THE
PRESUMPTION IS ALWAYS
AGAINST ANY INTENTION TO
ATTEMPT GIVING TO THE ACT
AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL OP
ERATION AND EFFECT.” Endlich, on Interpretation of Statutes, p.
233, announces the same principle. No
presumption arises, from a failure of
the State through its legislative author
ity to speak on the subject, THAT
THE STATE INTENDS TO
GRANT ANY RIGHT, PRIVI
LEGE OR AUTHORITY UNDER
ITS LAWS TO BE EXERCISED
BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION.
Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho, 236,
43 L. R. A. N. S., 240. Either the
statute applies to “such places within
the State as the Board may designate,”
or its scope is unlimited, and, for the
convenience of applicants, the Board
may hold examinations anywhere and
everywhere it sees fit. And if this
Board may go outside the State to
hold examinations, why may not every
other examining Board of the State do
likewise if the place is left to its dis
cretion? OBVIOUSLY, THIS
WOULD BE SUBVERSIVE OF
PUBLIC POLICY, OF THE
SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE
LAW, WOULD DEFEAT THE
VERY ENDS WHICH THESE

PROTECTIVE STATUTES WERE
ENACTED TO ACCOMPLISH,
AND MIGHT, IN EFFECT, MAKE
THE CREATURE GREATER
THAN THE CREATOR.
We must not be understood as hold
ing that the legislature may not require
certain official acts to be done beyond
the State’s limits, for it can legally do
so, as for example in requiring deposi
tions of witnesses or the acknowledg
ment of a deed or other instrument, to
be taken in some other State, or even
in a foreign country, and perhaps there
are other illustrations of this legisla
tive power. But they are done by its
express permission, and are not merely
implied.
The demurrer of the defendants ad
mits as true the allegations of the com
plaint that the defendants intended:
1. To hold the examination outside
of the State.
2. To use in that examination the
same questions that had been used in
the preceding week in an examination
in Raleigh, and
3. That these duplicate questions
were available to candidates for cer
tificates in the Washington examina
tion.
The defendants say that it was at
the solicitation of applicants and for
their convenience (not for the public
welfare or interest) that they proposed
to give the duplicate examination in
Washington the week following the
Raleigh examination. As a matter of
fact, the defendants do not deny that
some applicants were going to Wash
ington from North Carolina to take
the duplicate examination. This Court
may judge for itself of the relative
“convenience” of Washington and Ra
leigh for applicants already in this
State, and of the interest of the citi
zens of this State to be served by hold
ing a duplicate examination outside
the State the week after such examina
tion was held in Raleigh. THE
PLAINTIFF seems to be in entire
accord with the statement of THE DE
FENDANTS in their demurrer THAT
THE ACT creating the State Board
of Accountancy and prescribing its
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duties and powers, WAS PASSED IN
THE INTEREST OF THE GEN
ERAL PUBLIC, TO PROTECT
THEM AGAINST INCOMPE
TENT, INEFFICIENT, OR DIS
HONEST PERSONS, AND NOT
FOR THE PURPOSE OF GRANT
ING SPECIAL PRIVILEGES OR
EMOLUMENTS TO ANY CLASS
OF PERSONS. The plaintiff con
tends, however, that in attempting to
hold an examination in the city of
Washington, “at the earnest solicita
tion of numbers of applicants living in
that section,” and, as stated by de
fendants on the hearing, “for the con
venience of applicants,” the Board was
attempting to “grant special privileges”
to those applicants, and an even greater
“special privilege” was the intended use
of duplicate questions which were
available to applicants. This court
with these admitted facts before it can
judge whether an official act thus per
formed is “for the public interest” or
for the promotion of the personal in
terest of applicants. It is an unpre
cedented thing for the other examin
ing boards of the State to go beyond
the borders of the State to give exam
inations (MUCH LESS DUPLI
CATE EXAMINATIONS) to appli
cants who may not find it convenient
to come to the State to take the same.
Yet the defendants claim that they
are justified in going hundreds of miles
beyond the State boundaries, the week
following an examination in Raleigh,
to give a duplicate of that examina
tion because it is more convenient to
certain applicants to take the examin
ation in Washington—and some of the
applicants going from this State to
Washington for that purpose. As well
suggested by the plaintiffs’ learned
counsel, it is peculiar to Certified Ac
countants in Washington that the
mountain should come to Mohamet.
IT IS AN ESTABLISHED RULE
THAT WHEN THE MEANS FOR
THE EXERCISE OF A GRANTED
POWER ARE GIVEN, NO OTHER
OR DIFFERENT MEANS CAN BE
IMPLIED, AS BEING MORE EF
FECTIVE OR CONVENIENT.

Cooley’s Cons. Lim. (4th Ed.) p. 78.
In stating in the call that this was
“positively the last examination to be
held outside the State,” the Board of
Accountancy impliedly admits that it
considered such procedure irregular,
to say the least.
The authorities cited above, defining
judicial and quasi-judicial officers, also
establish the principle that when such
officers exceed their jurisdiction or
abuse their discretion, it is subject to
review by the courts; in fact so funda
mental is this principle that in most of
the cases the courts do not discuss it,
but address themselves to determining
whether or not the act complained of
was in excess of jurisdiction or in
abuse of discretion, and if they decide
these questions in the affirmative, then
it is held as a matter of course that the
act should be enforced or enjoined, as
the case may be. In Throop on Public
Officers, pp. 525, et seq., it is said that
where, in the exercise of a power, an
officer is vested with a discretion, his
act is regarded as quasi-judicial. But,
of course, if the officer or board at
tempts to exercise a power, either judi
cial or ministerial, in a case to which
his or its jurisdiction does not extend,
the act is either absolutely void or
voidable by judicial proceedings, as the
case may be. But the exercise of dis
cretionary power is always subject, in
some respects, to review by the courts.
So it may be reviewed, where it has
violated some rule of public policy, and
of course it will be violated by any
illegality or excess of jurisdiction. This
principle has been enacted into our
State laws for municipalities (C. S.
2962), giving to any taxable inhabitant
the right to maintain an action to set
aside or prevent any illegal official act
on the part of the municipality or its
officers, and it is also well settled by
numerous decisions of this Court, and
has received the sanction of the Su
preme Court of the United States in
Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S., 601,
609, quoted in Dillon Mun. Cor. Sec.
1581, and cited with approval in Strat
ford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C., 127. In
referring to statutes similar to our own
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as found in C. S. 2962, Dillon Mun.
Cor., Sec. 1585, says: “The first class
of wrongs provided for by the statute
is simply defined as ‘an illegal act,’
and the statute contains no express
provision that the illegal official act
against which redress is sought be
one which has resulted or will result
in loss or injury to the municipality.
So far as the literal language of the
statute is concerned, any illegal offi
cial act may be prevented at the suit
of a taxpayer having the requisite
status as such. This liberal interpre
tation of the statute has been sup
ported by the courts.” In the notes to
the above, it is said, citing authorities,
THAT AN ILLEGAL OFFICIAL
ACT which may be the subject of the
taxpayer’s action MAY BE ANY ACT
of a municipal officer—which is not
authorized by law or WHICH IS IN
EXCESS OF THE AUTHORITY
CONFERRED BY LAW. In actions
brought by taxpayers the court has
taken jurisdiction and has restrained
or annulled official acts of great diver
sity of character.
The State in the lawful exercise of its
POLICE POWER has created the
State Board of Accountancy and re
quired examinations of applicants TO
SAFEGUARD THE PUBLIC
AGAINST INCOMPETENT AC
COUNTANTS. Every citizen of the
State is, in a certain sense, injured
when the duties of the Board are per
formed in such a manner as to let
down the bars and lower the standards
of the profession. There is an especial
injury to properly accredited members
of the profession who have met the
conditions imposed by law, in the man
ner prescribed by law. Poor Richard
says, “He who hath a trade hath an
estate.” A man’s profession is his cap
ital. The State has set standards for
entrance into this profession, and those
who have entered in the manner pre
scribed by law are entitled to the pro
tection of the State to the extent at
least, that they shall not be unjustly
discriminated against by admission of
others into the profession in any other
way than that prescribed by law.
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It is not necessary to go beyond the
decisions of our own Court to estab
lish the contention that this is a sub
ject for the cognizance and interven
tion of our Courts. In Glenn v. Com
missioners 139 N. C., 421, our Court
said: “IF AN ULTRA VIRES ACT
WERE BEING THREATENED,
THE COURTS WOULD ENJOIN
IT.” IN ALL THE FOLLOWING
CASES IT IS SAID THAT WHEN
A DISCRETIONARY POWER IS
EXERCISED WRONGFULLY, OR
TRANSCENDS THE AUTHOR
ITY OF THE OFFICERS, OR IS
ULTRA
VIRES,
OR WHEN
THERE IS A MANIFEST ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, THE COURTS
WILL ENFORCE OR ENJOIN
THE ACT, as the case may be, at
the suit of a citizen, or taxpayer, AND
WHENEVER THE COURT HAS
DECLINED TO INTERVENE, IT
HAS BEEN ON THE GROUND
THAT THE ACT COMPLAINED
OF WAS INFRA VIRES. Broadnax
v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244; Vaughan v.
Commissioners, 118 N. C., 636; Strat
ford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C., 127; Ed
gerton v. Water Company, 126 N. C.,
92; Ewbanks v. Turner, 134 N. C., 77;
Barnes v. Commissioners, 135 N. C.,
27; Graves v. Commissioners, 135 N.
C., 49; Merrimon v. Paving Company,
142 N. C., 539; Newton v. Commis
sioners, 156 N. C., 116; Commission
ers v. Commissioners, 165 N. C., 632;
Supervisors v. Commrs., 169 N. C.,
548; Cobb v. R. R., 172 N. C., 58.
The decisions of the courts of other
States and the principle announced by
the various text-books, are well sum
marized in Perkins v. Indi. School
Dist., 56 Iowa, 476; 9 N. W., 356,
where it was held that the Courts of
the State are arbiters of all questions
involving the construction of the
statutes conferring authority upon of
ficers and jurisdiction upon special tri
bunals. It was certainly never the in
tention of the Legislature to confer
upon school boards, superintendents of
schools, or other officers discharging
quasi-judicial functions, exclusive au
thority to decide questions pertaining
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to their jurisdiction and the extent of
their power. All such questions may
be determined by the Courts of the
State. Hence, when the rights of a
citizen are involved, in the exercise of
authority by a school officer, the
courts may determine whether such au
thority was lawfully exercised.
As the demurrer, we have covered
the entire field of inquiry, as the facts
stated in the complaint are to be taken
as admitted. On the motion for a con
tinuance of the injunction to the hear
ing, there is an affidavit of Mr. G. G.
Scott, denying that the same questions
as propounded in the State were used
in the Washington examination, there
by giving the applicants there a de
cided advantage over those examined
here. But we need not settle the con
troversy of fact, because it has been
the rule for time out of mind that
where there is conflict in the evidence
the injunction is generally continued
to the hearing. We stated the pre
vailing rule in Cobb v. Clegg, 137 N.
C., 153, at p. 159., where it was said
that it is generally proper, when the
parties are at issue concerning the legal
or equitable right, to grant an inter
locutory injunction to preserve the
right IN STATU QUO until the de
termination of the controversy, and es
pecially in this rule when the principal
relief sought is in itself an injunction,
because a dissolution of a pending in
terlocutory injunction, or the refusal
of one, upon application therefor in
the first instance, will virtually decide
the case upon its merits and deprive
the plaintiff of all remedy or relief,
even though he should be afterwards
able to show ever so good a case. The
principles we have attempted to state,
are, we think, well supported by the
authorities upon this subject, citing 1
High on Injunctions, (3 Ed. Sec. 6;
Bishpams Eq. (6 Ed.) Sec. 405; Mar
shall v. Commrs., 89 N. C., 103; Cape
hart v. Mahoon, 45 N. C., 30; Jarman
v. Saunders, 64 N. C., 367; Lowe v.
Commrs., 70 N. C., 532, and other au
thorities. In the Marshall case, supra,
the court said: “The injunctive relief
sought in this action is not merely aux

iliary to the principal relief demanded,
but it is the relief, and a perpetual in
junction is demanded. To dissolve the
injunction, therefore, would be prac
tically to deny the relief sought and
terminate the action. This the court
will never do where it may be that pos
sibly the plaintiff is entitled to the re
lief demanded. In such cases it will
not determine the matter upon a pre
liminary hearing upon the pleading and
EX PARTE affidavits; but it will pre
serve the matter intact until the action
can be regularly heard upon its merits.
Any other course would defeat the
end to be attained by the action.” The
case last cited is directly in point here.
But without the aid of this principle
and the authorities sustaining it, we
hold that the injunction should have
been continued to the final hearing. It
is argued that this case is like that
where the tree was cut down, after the
restraining order against felling it had
been vacated. Harrison v. Bryan, 148
N. C., 315, and these additional cases
are cited supposedly to the same effect.
Pickler v. Board of Education, 129 N.
C., 221; Wallace v. North Wilkesboro,
155 N. C., 614; Moore v. Monument
Co., 166 N. C., 211. But they do not
apply to this case, as the facts are not
the same. In Harrison v. Bryan,
supra, the tree had fallen under the
stroke of the axe, never to rise again.
It could not grow again after it had
been destroyed. It had died and was
therefore beyond restoration. That was
a fact established, and not even a man
datory injunction could change it.
But here, the act of the defendants
may be repeated—it, at least, is pos
sible for them to do so, and plaintiffs
are not bound by their declared inten
tion not to repeat their mistake. THE
LAW WILL STRIP THEM OF
THE POWER TO DO SO BY ITS
RESTRAINING PROCESS.
The entire judgment below will be
reversed, injunction to the final hearing
issued, the demurrer overruled, and the
defendants permitted to answer over,
if they so desire.
REVERSED.
(Seal).
A true copy:
J. S. SEAWELL,
Clerk Supreme Court.

